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Abstract
In this note I discuss the condition for indeterminacy in the context of search
models with increasing returns in the matching technology. Building on the theo-
retical framework set forth by Giammarioli (2003), I argue that increasing returns
with respect to vacancies at the aggregate level is only a necessary requirement for
indeterminate equilibrium paths. Specifically, I show that sunspot equilibria can
actually be obtained by imposing an additional condition between the private and
the social elasticity of the matching function with respect to unemployment.
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1 Introduction
The issue of indeterminacy in the context of the matching framework a` la Pissarides
(2000) has been addressed by a number of authors. For instance, in a seminal work
Burda and Weder (2002) derive indeterminacy in a search and matching economy relying
on labour institutions such as payroll taxes, unemployment insurance and social assis-
tance. Moreover, Hashimzade and Ortigueira (2005) find out the possibility of sunspot
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equilibria by augmenting the standard matching model with capital accumulation. Fur-
thermore, Zanetti (2006) builds a New Keynesian model with search frictions showing that
indeterminacy may be driven by the shape of monetary policy functions. More recently,
Krause and Lubik (2010) develop a DSGE model with matching in the labour market
by arguing that extrinsic uncertainty can actually cause business cycles, but the required
parametrization lies at the boundaries of the region that the empirical literature would
consider plausible.
A common feature of the contributions mentioned above is the assumption of constant-
returns-to-scale in the matching function. However, it is well-known that indeterminacy
has been often framed in the context of increasing returns (cf. Benhabib and Farmer
1994). In confirmation of this, there is a work by Giammarioli (2003) that sets forth
a dynamic search model developed in continuous time in which a representative agent
chooses the optimal vacancy rate while (un)employment evolves according to the rules of
a standard matching framework.
Relying on this theoretical setting, Giammarioli (2003) argues that an aggregate
matching function with increasing returns with respect to vacancies is a sufficient re-
quirement for the local indeterminacy of the equilibrium paths followed by the model
economy. This dynamic characterization should arise when the stationary solution of the
model is given by a sink, i.e., a situation in which the unstable manifold has dimension
zero. In this way, sunspot equilibria become possible and the matching economy may
justify the ‘animal spirits’ hypothesis of business cycles (e.g. Farmer and Guo 1994).
In this note, building on the same matching framework described by Giammarioli
(2003), I argue that increasing returns with respect to vacancies is only a necessary con-
dition for local indeterminacy; indeed, I show that the required bifurcation is actually
obtained by imposing an additional condition between the ‘perceived’ (or private) and
the ‘aggregate’ (or social) elasticity of the matching function with respect to unemploy-
ment.
The note is arranged as follows. Section 2 reviews a centralized matching economy
with search. Section 3 analyses the dynamics of the benchmark model. Finally, section 4
concludes.
2 A centralized matching economy
Suppose that L is the employment rate while V is the vacancy rate. Thereafter, the
agent charged to set the optimal number of job openings is assumed to solve the following
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problem:
max
V
∫
+∞
0
exp (−ρt) (lnL− V ) dt ρ > 0 (1)
s.to
·
L = M − δL 0 < δ < 1 (2)
where ρ is the discount rate, M is the matching function while δ is the instantaneous
separation rate.
The matching function has the conventional text-book form. Hence,
M = A (1− L)b V a a+ b = 1 (3)
where A is a shifting parameter that conveys the efficiency of matching while (1− L) is
the unemployment rate.
The shifting parameter of the matching function, taken as given by the maximizing
agent, is defined as
A ≡
(
1− L
)β−b
V
α−a
(4)
where L and V are, respectively, the average level of employment and the average number
of vacancies in the whole economy.
In a symmetric equilibrium, i.e., whenever L = L and V = V , the matching function
in eq. (3) reduces to
M = (1− L)β V α (5)
The result in eq. (5) reveals that this framework allows to reconcile a situation of
constant returns at the private level, i.e., a + b = 1, with the possibility of a matching
technology that - on the contrary - displays increasing returns at the aggregate (or social)
level, i.e., α + β > 1. It is worth noting that, in this case, the condition α > 1 conveys
an aggregate Beveridge curve with a non-monotonic concavity. Specifically, when M has
increasing returns with respect to vacancies, the Beveridge curve is convex (concave) at
low (high) unemployment rates.1 Technical details are given in Appendix.
1Changes in the concavity of the Beveridge curve are discussed, inter alia, by Benati and Lubik (2014),
Lubik and Rhodes (2014), Bonthuis et al. (2013), Lubik (2013).
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Whenever the Hosios (1990) condition is met, i.e., when bargaining power of workers
coincides with private elasticity of the matching function with respect to unemployment,
the problem in eq.s (1) and (2) can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium by
assuming that wages are determined through a Nash bargaining mechanism. As a con-
sequence, the efficient dynamics of a decentralized solution is strictly equivalent to the
dynamic patterns implied by the centralized matching economy described above.
3 Dynamics of the benchmark model
The system of autonomous differential equations derived from the solution of the opti-
mization problem in eq.s (1) and (2) is given by
·
l = exp ((a1 − 1) l + a2λ+K)− δ (6)
·
λ = δ + ρ− exp (−l − λ) + b
exp (a1l + a2λ+K)
1− exp (l)
(7)
where l ≡ lnL, λ is the logarithm of the co-state variable associated to the state variable
L, a1 ≡ −βL ((1− α) (1− L))
−1, a2 ≡ α (1− α)
−1 and K ≡ a2 ln (a).
The Jacobian matrix (J) of the linearized system is the following:
J ≡
[
(a1 − 1) δ a2δ
(ρ+ δ + bδu) + ba1uδ + u
2bδ a2ubδ + (ρ+ δ + bδu)
]
(8)
where u ≡ L (1− L)−1 (cf. Giammarioli 2003, p. 22).
The trace of J is given by
TR (J) = a1δ + a2ubδ + ρ+ bδu (9)
Substituting for a1 and a2 leads to
TR (J) =
αubδ − uβδ
1− α
+ ρ+ bδu (10)
Resorting to numerical simulations, Gimmarioli (2003, tables 1 and 2, pp. 29 − 30)
sets β = b. As a consequence, eq. (10) reduces to
TR (J) = ρ (11)
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Taking into account the result in eq. (11), it is possible to conclude that whenever β =
b, the trace of J is exactly equal to the discount rate of the maximizing agent. Considering
the hypothesis of positive discounting, ρ is always positive. Therefore, whenever β = b,
the trace of J is positive no matter the value of α.
Since the trace of J provides the sum of the two eigenvalues - say r1 and r2 - associated
to the dynamic system in eq.s (6) and (7), it seems hard to configure the possibility of
indeterminate equilibrium paths, unless admitting an implausible negative discounting;
indeed, such a dynamic characterization requires a negative value of TR(J). This state-
ment is confirmed by the numerical results in tables 1 and 2 in which - keeping constant
ρ and δ - the quantitative extent of r1 and r2 is retrieved for different values of a,b, α and
β.2
α = a β = b r1 r2 DYNAMICS
0.70 0.30 −1.737 1.767 Saddle
0.65 0.35 −1.473 1.503 Saddle
0.60 0.40 −1.290 1.320 Saddle
0.55 0.45 −1.156 1.186 Saddle
0.50 0.50 −1.058 1.088 Saddle
0.45 0.55 −0.986 1.016 Saddle
0.40 0.60 −0.932 0.962 Saddle
0.35 0.65 −0.894 0.924 Saddle
0.30 0.70 −0.869 0.899 Saddle
Table 1: Matching function with constant returns (ρ = 0.03 and δ = 0.1)
β = b a α r1 r2 DYNAMICS
0.40 0.60 0.60 −1.290 1.320 Saddle
0.40 0.60 0.70 −1.265 1.295 Saddle
0.40 0.60 0.80 −1.351 1.381 Saddle
0.40 0.60 0.90 −1.702 1.732 Saddle
0.40 0.60 0.99 −4.931 4.961 Saddle
0.40 0.60 1.01 0.015− 4.850i 0.015 + 4.850i Source
0.40 0.60 1.05 0.015− 4.850i 0.015 + 4.850i Source
0.40 0.60 1.10 0.015− 1.413i 0.015 + 1.413i Source
0.40 0.60 1.20 0.015− 0.920i 0.015 + 0.920i Source
2MAT LABTM 6.5 codes used to derive those results are available from the author.
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Table 2: Matching function with increasing returns (ρ = 0.03 and δ = 0.1)
The numerical results in tables 1 and 2 convey two broad conclusions. First, as
long as the private and the social matching functions display constant returns to scale,
the stationary solution of the dynamic system is given by a saddle point. In this case,
the equilibrium path of the model economy is determinate since there exists a unique
trajectory that verifies the first-order conditions (FOCs) of the maximum problem in eq.s
(1) and (2). Moreover, when the aggregate matching function displays increasing returns,
determinacy fails but - as long as β = b - the stationary solution is given by a source. In
this case, the trajectories generated by eq.s (6) and (7) cannot be optimal because their
explosive tendency will lead to the violation of the transversality condition that enters
the FOCs of the problem in eq.s (1) and (2).3
In order to find the requirements for indeterminacy, I consider the more general case
in which β is different from b. Hence,
TR (J) =
uδ (αb− β)
1− α
+ ρ+ bδu (12)
Whenever α > 1, the condition under which TR(J) is negative is the following:
αb− β > 0 or α >
β
b
(13)
This is exactly the condition provided by Giammarioli (2003, p. 23). However, (13)
necessary but not sufficient; indeed, it must also happen that
∣∣∣∣uδ (αb− β)1− α
∣∣∣∣ > ρ+ bδu (14)
Straightforward algebra suggests that whenever α > 1, the inequality in (14) is verified
if and only if b > β. This means that a sink, i.e., indeterminacy of equilibrium paths, is
actually obtained when the aggregate matching function displays increasing returns with
respect to vacancy while, at the private level, the reactivity of the matching function to
unemployment is higher than its aggregate counterpart. This statement is confirmed by
the numerical results in table 3.
The figures in table 3 reveals another interesting features of the indeterminate model
economy, i.e., the fact that when the stationary solution is indeterminate the eigenvalues
of the system in eq.s (6) and (7) becomes complex. As a consequence, adjustments towards
equilibrium occur through convergent oscillations.
3Such a transversality condition is given by lim
t→∞
exp (−ρt) exp (λ (t)) = 0.
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β b a α r1 r2 DYNAMICS
0.40 0.50 0.60 0.60 −1.168 1.455 Saddle
0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 −1.134 1.435 Saddle
0.40 0.50 0.60 0.80 −1.191 1.552 Saddle
0.40 0.50 0.60 0.90 −1.441 2.022 Saddle
0.40 0.50 0.60 0.99 −3.0765 7.8553 Saddle
0.40 0.50 0.60 1.01 −2.285− 4.244i −2.285 + 4.244i Sink
0.40 0.50 0.60 1.05 −0.4179− 2.034i −0.417 + 2.034i Sink
0.40 0.50 0.60 1.10 −0.1861− 1.393i −0.186 + 1.393i Sink
0.40 0.50 0.60 1.20 −0.0725− 0.913i −0.072 + 0.913i Sink
Table 3: Matching function with increasing returns and b > β (ρ = 0.03 and δ = 0.1)
The analytical and numerical findings derived above are not surprising. For instance,
in their seminal article on indeterminacy and increasing returns, Benhabib and Farmer
(1994) show that in the optimal-growth model indeterminacy requires increasing returns
with respects to the control variable (labour) and an aggregate output elasticity with
respect to the stock variable (capital) higher then its private counterpart.
4 Concluding remarks
In this note, building on Giammarioli (2003), I show that within the text-book matching
model a` la Pissarides (2000) indeterminacy of the equilibrium paths requires increasing
returns at the aggregate level with respect to the control variable (vacancies) and an
aggregate elasticity of the matching function with respect to the state variable (unem-
ployment) higher than its private counterpart. Form the point of view of the theory on
dynamic systems, this result is isomorphic to the standard requirements for indeterminacy
that hold in the conventional model of optimal growth (cf. Benhabib and Farmer 1994).
5 Appendix
In a symmetric equilibrium, the model described in section 2 implies the following Bev-
eridge curve:
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V =
(
δ(1− U)
Uβ
) 1
α
(A.1)
where U ≡ 1− L is the unemployment rate.
The expression in eq. (A.1) reveals that the Bevridge curve is a monotonically decreas-
ing function of U for all the eligible values of α, β and δ.4 In addition, straightforward
algebra conveys that the concavity of (A.1) depends on the sign of the following coefficient
Φ ≡
(1− α) (U (1− β) + β)
(
1 + β 1−U
U
)
α (1− U)
+
2U (1− β) + 3β
U2
(A.2)
Specifically, when Φ is positive (negative), the Beveridge curve in eq. (A.1) is convex
(concave). Those analytical results can be easily linked with the dynamic findings outlined
in section 3. On the one hand, in the case of determinacy, i.e., whenever α + β =
1, the expression in (A.2) is always positive. As a consequence, the Beveridge curve
displays the conventional convex pattern. On the other hand, whenever the conditions
for indeterminacy are met and, notably, α > 1, the first addend of Φ becomes negative.
Since this term follows a reverse-u-shaped pattern with respect to U while the second
addend is positive and decreasing with lower bound at 2 + β, Φ may chance its sign as U
approaches to 1. Setting α = 1.2 and β = 0.4, this possibility is illustrated in figure A1.
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
−20
0
20
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Figure A1: Indeterminacy and the concavity of the Beveridge curve
4Indeed, ∂V/∂U = − (δ/α)
(
δ(1− U)/Uβ
)(1−α)/α
(1 + β (1− U) /U) /U2 < 0 for all the eligibles α, β
and δ.
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The diagram shows that when the unemployment rate is around 95%, Φ switches from
positive to negative. As a consequence, beyond this critical threshold the Beveridge curve
becomes concave.
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